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Abstract
Following Miguel et al. (2004), we use temperature and hours of sunshine varia-
tions as instrumental variables for economic growth in 27 Chinese provinces during
198198. Our 2SLS (Two-stage least squares) regression nds that growth has no
signicant e¤ect on nancial deregulation after controlling for predetermined home-
bias political variable, population size, and time and province e¤ects. Moreover,
the home-bias political variable has a signicant e¤ect on nancial deregulation,
which shows that political and cultural factors are important driving forces in de-
termining the path and logic of Chinese nancial deregulation. The results hold up
when we use GMM (Generalized method of moments) to deal with heteroskedastic-
ity. The results are also robust in LIML (Limited information maximum likelihood)
estimation that deals with weak instruments.
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1 Introduction
The role of nancial sector in the process of economic development has gained long-
standing attention from academics and policy makers alike. This is understandable since
nancial sector is essential for the functioning of a capitalist society. Unfortunately, there
is a debate on the nance-growth nexus (see Levine, 2005 for a review). Some authors
such as Schumpeter (1912), McKinnon (1973), King and Levine (1993) and Levine and
Zervos (1998) highlight the role of nance in promoting growth. In contrast, from the
perspective of Robinson (1952) and Lucas (1988), Finance does not cause growth; nance
responds automatically to changing demands from the real sector.(Levine, 2005).
There is an enormously large body of existing literature that studies the e¤ect of
nance on growth (reviewed by Levine). However, there are few studies testing the con-
jecture of Robinson and Lucas. In this paper, we examine the e¤ect of growth on nance.
Considering the aforementioned debate, our investigation is also important for us to un-
derstand the relationship between nance and growth. However, estimating the e¤ect of
growth on nance is di¢ cult because of endogeneity and omitted variable bias.
In this paper we use exogenous variations in temperature and hours of sunshine as
instrumental variables for economic growth in order to estimate the impact of economic
growth on nancial deregulation, inspired by Miguel et al. (2004). Miguel et al. argue
that weather shocks are plausible instruments for growth in gross domestic product (GDP)
in economies that largely rely on agriculture (i.e., are not heavily industrialized). The
instrumental variable (IV) method makes it credible to assert that the association between
growth and nancial deregulation is a causal relationship rather than simply a correlation.
The nancial deregulation experience in the Peoples Republic of China (hereafter
China) for the period 1978-1998 is suitable for this identication strategy. During this
period, China is not heavily industrialized and the agricultural sector remains large. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates that agriculture played an important role in the Chinese economy from
1981 to 1998. For a backward province, Inner Mongolia, its agricultural real output con-
sists of about 40% of real GDP. Even for Beijing, its agricultural real output is around
20% of real GDP. For Inner Mongolia, over 67% of labor was in agriculture in 1978,
and its labor share in agriculture was still around 50% by 1998. Our data show that
weather shocks are signicantly related to economic growth across Chinese provinces (in
the rst-stage regression).
[Figure 1 Here]
A further strength of our empirical strategy is that it allows us to address the prob-
lem of measurement error in Chinas national income gures, which generates controversy
in the literature. Some criticize that Chinas GDP gures are unreliable (Rawski, 2001;
Young, 2003), while others show that they are reliable and the criticism is due to misun-
derstanding (Chow, 1993; Holtz, 2003). The measurement error on explanatory variables
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would bias coe¢ cient estimates on them toward zero. If the instrument variables are un-
correlated with the measurement error, the IV approach addresses the attenuation bias.
Another appealing feature of the Chinese nancial deregulation experience is that
the Chinese nancial deregulation was conducted following the gradual approach. This
yields substantive variations across time and across provinces in the degree of nancial
deregulation. Our analysis exploits these substantive variations.
Our main empirical ndings are as follows. Using the reform period Chinese panel data
on 27 provinces during the period 1981-98, we isolate the variation of growth explained
by the variations in temperature and hours of sunshine variations and nd that it has no
signicant causal e¤ect on nancial deregulation after controlling for the political variable,
the size of population, and time and province e¤ects. Moreover, the home-bias political
variable has a signicant e¤ect on nancial deregulation, which shows that political and
cultural factors are important driving forces in determining the path and logic of Chinese
nancial deregulation (consistent with the argument of Shirk, 2003).
After we briey introduce the Chinese nancial deregulation, in section 2 we construct
the variables. Section 3 presents the estimation results. Section 4 concludes.
1.2 The Chinese Gradual Financial Reform
Before 1978, China was a command economy. The nancial system is underdeveloped
with the government playing a dominant role (Lardy, 1998, ch. 3; Naughton, 1995,
ch. 1). Interest rates were set administratively; monetary policy was conducted through
direct allocation of credit and renancing. Capital markets were nonexistent. The primary
nancial intermediaries were state banks that work under the command of the government.
In 1978, the Chinese government embarked on gradual nancial deregulation aimed at
establishing a market-based nancial system. The Chinese gradual nancial deregulation
studied by previous works (see Lardy, 1998; Chow, 2004; Shirk, 2003; Brandt and Zhu,
2007) refers to the following. Across time, it involves a gradual implementation of piece-
meal nancial deregulation policies over a long period of time. Common themes of the
piece-meal policies include the provision of more autonomy in credit allocation to state-
owned banks, the removal of restrictions on their ownership structure, and the relaxation
of geographical and legal restrictions on the entry of new nancial intermediaries. Across
provinces, it refers to a process that allows some provinces to implement some piece-meal
nancial deregulation policies rst. Specically, each year, the government may choose
some nancial deregulation policies and designate some cities and rarely some province(s)
to carry out such policies. After one year or more, the government may spread them to
the whole province, further to several provinces, and nally to the whole country. After
decades of reform, state banks have been built into joint-stock commercial banks; various
markets like money, bond and equity markets have been created. The role of market in
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nancial resource allocation has been enhanced. Nevertheless, the objectives of Chinese
nancial deregulation are far from being accomplished, and there are still many unresolved
issues in the nancial deregulation process (see Lardy, 1998; Naughton, 1998).
2 Data
We use the following formulation for empirical assessment:
FDeregit = 1Growthit + 2(POLITICS)i;t 1 + 3 ln(POP )it + ui + Tt + "it (1)
where FDeregit is the degree of nancial deregulation for ith province at period t detailed
in section 2.1. Growth is the average annual growth of real GDP per worker, constructed
in section 2.2. The rst control variable is the lagged political variable, denoted by
POLITICSi;t 1 detailed in section 2.4. The reason to control for the political variable
is two-fold. First, Levine (2005) reviews the nance-growth nexus literature and concludes
that nance is usually inuenced by political, legal and cultural factors. Second, Shirk
(2003) argues that Chinas nancial deregulation was conducted on a political ground.
Following the study of Miguel et al. (2004), our second control variable is the logarithm
of the size of population, denoted by POP . We conjecture that it is possible that when
the government chooses the places to conduct nancial deregulation, the local size of the
economy such as the population may be one factor that the government considers. ui and
Tt stand for xed province and time e¤ects respectively.
We do not include more control variables for several reasons. First, it is hard to nd
variables with available data and with time and provincial variations that may determine
the path and logic of nancial deregulation in China. Second, growth may impact nan-
cial deregulation indirectly by a¤ecting the other variables that may inuence nancial
deregulation. Therefore, to get an estimated total e¤ect of growth on nancial deregu-
lation, we do not go further to nd more variables. This strategy is actually adopted in
Franker and Romer (1999) who try to identify the e¤ects of trade on growth.
Estimating the impact of economic growth on nancial deregulation is di¢ cult be-
cause of endogeneity and omitted variable bias (Solow, 2003, also discusses the e¤ect of
institutions on growth). We use the variations of temperature and hours of sunshine as
instrumental variables for economic growth. This identication strategy concurs with
Miguel et al. (2004) who use rainfall variations for growth.
2.1 Constructing Financial Deregulation Indicators
We locate Chinas nancial deregulation policies from the book The Big Economic Events
since Chinas Reform and Opening-up (1978-1998).1 The international symposium or-
1There are other books documenting the gradual nancial deregulation policies in China during the
period 1978-1998, but the big events are similar across these books.
3
ganized by the Chinese Economists Society at the University of Southern California in
1997 divides Chinas nancial deregulation policies as follows:
1. Domestic Financial Deregulation
(a) Reforms of the banking sector:
i. Reforming commercial banks and policy banks;
ii. Regulations of banking institutions in China;
iii. Entry of foreign banks in enhancing competition;
iv. Possibilities of more domestic private banks.
(b) Non-bank Financial Institutions and Regulations:
i. Insurance market;
ii. Non-bank deposit market, and non-bank deposit-taking institutions;
iii. Regulations on gray and black credit market for small loans.
2. Capital Market Development
(a) On Equity and Bond market;
(b) On Foreign Exchange Market.
We quantify all the nancial deregulation policies into one single indicator, denoted
as FD. Following the previous literature that studies banking sector and stock market
separately (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001), we further divide
the nancial deregulation policies into banking/non-bank policies (the policies belong to
the domestic nancial deregulation above), denoted as BANK, and stock market ones
(the policies belong to the above capital market development), referred to as STOCK.
Since most nancial deregulation policies are at the city level, we rst construct the
city level dummy variables. Then we aggregate them to the provincial level, using the
ratios of the citiespopulation to their provincial population as weights:
Index =
X
j
(
X
i
Total Population of City i in Y ear t
Total Population of the Province in Y ear t
 I tci + I tp) (2)
where I tci is a dummy variable that equals one if city i receives a nancial deregulation
policy j in year t; I tp is an indicator variable that equals one if a nancial deregulation
policy j is conducted in the province. Adding together all policies (the j
0
s) in and before
year t for all the cities within a province yields its policy index for year t. The data on
the citiespopulation are from the Statistical Yearbook on Chinas Cities.
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For indicator Bank, if a deregulation policy is conducted through one of the big four
state banks of China,2 a weight of 1
4
is imposed on the policy. A weight of 1
5
is given to
the policies as there are already big four state banks in operation. No adjustments are
made for the other policies. An ideal weight should further consider the quality of the
enforcement of the policies. However, nding a quality measure is a daunting task, hence
we leave it to future research. The detailed data are presented in the Appendix. The
summary statistics for our nancial deregulation indexes are presented in Table 1.
[Table 1 Here]
2.2 Data on Real GDP Growth
The Statistical Yearbook of China (SYC) provides nominal GDP and GDP indexes for
each province. Holtz (2003) shows that the Chinese GDP data are reliable, while others
question their reliability (see Rawski, 2001). The problem with the implicit GDP deator
has been analyzed by Young (2003). Young decomposes the Chinese output into sectors
and uses available price indices. He nds out that this would lower the aggregate GDP
growth by 1.7%. In our cross province comparisons, this problem can be treated as
measurement error on the independent variable, which can be dealt with IV regressions
as long as the instruments are uncorrelated with the measurement error on GDP. With
the nominal GDP and the GDP indexes and 1978 as our base year, the real GDP can
be calculated as follows. We multiply the nominal GDP in 1978 by the GDP index in
that year then divide the result by 100. The GDP deator, which is not needed in our
analysis, can then be backed out.
To calculate our independent variable, the growth rate of real GDP per worker, we
need data on the labor force. However, there is a large statistical adjustment in 1990 on
labor force. This has been analyzed in Young (1233-1234). For instance, the provincial
statistical bureau of Jiangsu reported its labor force by using a new measurement detailed
in Young. Resultantly, its labor force jumps from 35.19 million in 1989 to 42.25 million in
1990, while the SYC lists its labor force at 35.69 million in 1990. The provincial statistical
bureau reports 6.56 million more workers. The provincial statistical bureau of Jiangsu
should revise its labor force data before 1989 accordingly, but it did not. Around half of
Chinese provinces made the changed in 1990. One can infer that it is not the case that
the provincial statistical bureau has made up the numbers. Instead, it is just the change
in statistical caliber as detailed in Young. Fortunately, SYC has maintained the original
statistical caliber and provided the data on provincial labor force. Therefore, this relative
more consistent series provided by SYC allow us to cover the periods before and after
1990 to avoid spurious labor force growth(Young, p. 1234).
2The big four state banks of China are: Bank of China (BOC), the Industrial and Commercial Bank
of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank (CCB), and the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC).
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Now with the labor force data and the real GDP data, we can calculate the growth
rate of real GDP per worker (our main independent variable).
Since the book on nancial deregulation only covers the period 1978-1998, our data
sample ends at 1998. Before 1998, among the 31 provincial governments in China, four
are municipalities and four are autonomous regions. We delegate the usage province
to all. Before 1997, Chongqing was a city of Sichuan province, hence both of them
are excluded from the sample. Hainan was part of Guangdong before it became an
independent province. Since there is a complete set of data for Guangdong, it is kept
in the data sample while Hainan is dropped. Tibet is excluded because there are many
missing data. In summary, the data sample comprises panel data of 27 provinces and 18
years (1981-1998). We will follow the common practice in the empirical growth literature
to take six-year average of our data. The six-year averaging of the data matches, to some
extent, with the political cycle in China. The National Peoples Congress (NPC) and
the Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) are held in the same
year every ve years starting from 1978, setting up all the important economic policies in
China. Therefore, our sample produces a balanced panel with 81 observations.
2.3 Weather Data
The Weather Yearbook of China (WYC) provides monthly data on temperature and
hours of sunshine for the capital city of the Chinese provinces from 1985 to 1998. The
data before 1985 are not available since the WYC started from 1985. Since we employ
the Chinese panel data from 1981 to 1998 and take six-year averages to avoid the business
cycle phenomena, we have three sub-periods: 1981-86, 1987-92, and 1993-98. In China
most provincial capital city is located in the middle of the province, so we treat the data
for capital city as the average for the whole province. Since sub-periods 1987-92 and
1993-98 have complete data, we calculate the weather indicators as follows. We calculate
temperature yearly di¤erence3 for each year and then average over six years to get
average temperature yearly di¤erence, denoted by Tempdi¤. We calculate the variance
for each year based on the 12 month data and then take six-year averages to get the
variations for temperature and sunshine, denoted by Tempvar and Sunvar respectively.
Since sub-period 1981-86 only has data for 1985-1986, we get the weather indicators
from the Natural Resources Database of China Academy of Sciences (denoted by CAS-
NRD). CAS-NRD provides weather data for around 600 weather observatories across
China. Each weather observatory has monthly data points on temperature and hours
of sunshine for the period 1951-80. Given the 24 data points each weather observatory
has, we calculate its temperature yearly di¤erence, variance of monthly temperatures, and
variance of monthly hours of sunshine. Since each province has around 20 weather obser-
3Temperature yearly di¤erence is the di¤erence between the highest and lowest monthly average
temperatures, which measures the annual range of temperature.
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vatories in 20 cities/counties, we take averages of the data over the weather observatories
to get the provincial data on Tempdi¤, Tempvar, and Sunvar.
2.4 Other Control variables
Levine (2005) reviews that many studies suggest that nance is inuenced by legal, polit-
ical and cultural factors. As far as China is concerned, political, cultural and institutional
factors determine the path and logic of nancial deregulation. Shirk (2003, p.129), for
instance, argues that the path of nancial reform in China since 1979 reects a political
logic: The actual pattern of economic reform did not reect economic theories so much
as it did the conict of various kinds of interests, that is the conict, coordination, and
balancing of interests between various trades and industries, between urban and rural
areas, between localities, and between localities and the central authorities.Therefore,
politics is one important factor in driving the path and logic of nancial deregulation.
Moreover, culture plays an important role in determining the path of nancial deregula-
tion. The Chinese culture is that policy makers tend to give preferential policies to their
hometown. We term this as the home-bias of politicians. We combine the political and
cultural factors to build our home-bias political variable (detailed below).
Following the literature on politician turnovers and economics growth in China, we
nd the book entitled Annals of the O¢ cials of the Peoples Republic of China. It
lists Chinas government o¢ cials and their tenure in o¢ ce for all the national government
departments from its founding in 1949 to year 2003. We argue that the bargaining and
coordination of these government o¢ cials of the highest rank, i.e. the ministers of all the
national government departments, plays an important role in determining what provinces
receive the preferential treatment in the process of nancial deregulation. We choose the
ministers, rather than the vice-ministers, of all the national government departments to
represent the distribution of political powers. This is because in the Chinese institutional
framework in which the minister has absolute power over the vice-ministers in making the
nal decisions. Therefore, we nd over 200 ministers for over 100 national government
departments (some of them were closed after 1978 and some were set up after 1978) during
the reform period 1978-1998.
During our sample period 1981-1998, the majority of the national government de-
partment ministers are generals or o¢ cers of the Peoples Liberation Army or important
members of the Chinese Communist Party. They earn their power in war and in the
founding of China. After the founding of China in 1949 when their age was mainly in the
range of 20-40, they continued to work as the national government department ministers
until retirement. Therefore, their selection into o¢ ce was mainly based on their role in
war, which is exogenous to the process of nancial deregulation.
We use culture to assign the national government department ministers to the provinces.
As argued, the ministers are inuenced by the Chinese culture in choosing the designated
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cities or provinces to conduct nancial deregulation: they tend to favor the province
where they were born (the aforementioned home-bias of the politicians). Therefore, we
nd the birth-provinces for all the national government department ministers. We build
the province level time series political variable as follows. For instance, during the 1993-
1998 period, the minister of the Ministry of Communications is Zhendong Huang who was
born in Jiangsu province. Therefore, we assign a value 1 to Jiangsu province and zeros
to all the other provinces for our sample period 1993-1998. We repeat the dummy vari-
able operations for all the national government department ministers. However, suppose
minister Huang was in o¢ ce for the period March 1993 to December 1995, then we would
assign Jiangsu province a value that equals the ratio of the number of years he is in o¢ ce
to the number of years in the period 1993-1998 (i.e., 6), which is roughly 0.5 in this case.
Finally, we add up all the dummy variables to get the provincial level political variable.
We repeat the same steps for other two sub-periods. To avoid potential endogeneity prob-
lem, we use the lagged values of the political variable. For example, the value of period
1987-1992 is given to period 1993-1998. This makes more sense because it may take a
while for the national government department ministers to bargain over and nally set up
the deregulation policies. Moreover, it takes time to carry out the deregulation policies.
The last control variable is the logarithm of population. We rst take six-year averages
of the population data and then take logarithm.
3 Estimation Results
3.1 LSDV (Least squares dummy variables) Estimation
We rst use LSDV estimation to test the relationship between nancial deregulation and
growth with the three nancial deregulation indexes. That is, we use OLS (Ordinary
least squares) estimation that includes 27 province dummies and 3 time dummies. Table
2 summarizes the results.
Column 2.1 in Table 2 reports the LSDV results with the banking/nonbank deregula-
tion index, BANK. One can see that the estimated coe¢ cient on Growth is positive and
signicant at the 1% level. It means a higher rate of economic growth is associated with a
higher degree of banking/nonbank deregulation. The estimated coe¢ cient on the lagged
political variable is positive and signicant at the 5% level. This shows that the political
and cultural factors play an important role in determining banking/nonbank deregulation
in China. The estimated coe¢ cient on ln(POP) is positive but insignicant at the 10%
level. That is, population size has no impact on banking/nonbank deregulation.
Column 2.2 in Table 2 reports the LSDV results with the nancial deregulation index
(FD) that quanties all the nancial deregulation policies. The estimated coe¢ cient on
Growth is positive and signicant at the 5% level. It means a higher rate of economic
growth is associated with a higher degree of nancial deregulation. The estimated coe¢ -
cient on the lagged political variable is positive and signicant at the 5% level. Therefore,
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political and cultural factors have signicant e¤ects on nancial deregulation in China.
The estimated coe¢ cient on ln(POP) is positive but insignicant at the 10% level.
Column 2.3 in Table 2 reports the LSDV results with the stock market deregulation
index (STOCK). The estimated coe¢ cient on Growth is positive but insignicant at
the 10% level. The estimated coe¢ cient on the lagged political variable is positive and
signicant at the 1% level. This shows that the home-bias political variable also plays an
important role in determining the path and logic of stock market deregulation in China.
The estimated coe¢ cient on ln(POP) is positive but insignicant at the 10% level. That
is, population size has no impact on stock market deregulation.
[Table 2 Here]
3.2 Endogeneity and 2SLS Regression
As argued, the potential reverse causality between growth and nancial deregulation, the
measurement error on the growth rate of China, and the potential omitted variable bias
make the LSDV estimators biased and inconsistent. Therefore, we use the variations of
temperature and hours of sunshine as instrumental variables for economic growth. Here
we report the results with the banking/nonbank deregulation index, BANK. The results
with the other two nancial deregulation indicators are reported in section 3.4.3. We rst
report the 2SLS (two-stage least squares) estimation results.
The rst-stage results of 2SLS estimation are reported in Table 3. Column 3.1 presents
the results without controlling for the political variable and the population size. One can
see that each of the variations of the weather indicators has a signicant e¤ect on growth
at least at the 5% level. The F-test shows that they jointly have a signicant e¤ect on
growth at the 1% level. The F-statistic on the excluded instruments (the variations of the
weather indicators) is slightly smaller than 10. The results are similar when we further
control for the political variable and the population size. We will use the LIML (limited
information maximum likelihood) estimation to deal with the potential weakness of the
instruments.4 The weak identication (Cragg-Donald) test statistic is always larger than
the Stock-Yogo critical value for the 10% maximal LIML size (not reported), meaning we
reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak. Nevertheless, the second stage
results of LIML estimation are reported in column 4.2 in Table 4.
[Table 3 Here]
The second stage results of 2SLS estimation are presented in column 4.1 in Table 4.
One can observe that the estimated coe¢ cient on Growth remains positive but becomes
insignicant at the 10% level. It means that economic growth has no causal e¤ect on
4Stock and Yogo (2002) show that in the presence of weak instruments, LIML is far superior to 2SLS
estimation. Murray (2006) surveys the literature on invalid and weak instruments.
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banking/nonbank deregulation. The estimated coe¢ cient on the lagged political variable
remains positive and signicant at the 1% level. This shows that the political and cultural
factors play an important role in determining the path and logic of banking/nonbank
deregulation in China. The estimated coe¢ cient on ln(POP) is positive but insignicant
at the 10% level. That is, population size has no impact on banking/nonbank deregulation.
[Table 4 Here]
3.3 More on the Validity of the Instruments
In the introduction we have argued why weather variations are valid instruments for eco-
nomic growth. Nevertheless, with more instruments than endogenous variables, we can
test the validity of the instruments. According to column 4.1 in Table 4, the Sargan test
yields a p-value 0.73 and the Basamann test yields a p-value 0.83. Both are much above
10%, meaning the over-identifying restrictions tests support the validity of the instru-
ments. Nevertheless, it is commonly known that these tests have little statistical power.
Therefore, we should rely on similar arguments in Miguel et al. (2004) for supporting
the validity of the instruments. Our introduction has presented the detailed argument on
why the variations of weather indicators are valid instruments for our study.
We are aware of the possibility that the variations of weather variables may impact
nancial deregulation via other channels. However, as stated, it is hard to nd variables
with available data and with time and provincial variations that may determine the path
and logic of nancial deregulation in China. Therefore, we focus on the explanatory vari-
ables that we have, namely the lagged political variable and the size of population. We
have argued in section 2.4 that the lagged political variable is exogenous to the process of
nancial deregulation. Since the ministers were mainly selected into o¢ ce based on their
performance in war, the political variable is also exogenous to the growth process. This
makes it unlikely that the home-bias political variable is inuenced by the variations in
weather via the channel of economic growth. Nevertheless, we nd that the variations of
weather variables (alone or jointly) are not signicantly associated with either the lagged
political variable or the current period political variable, indicating that the political vari-
able cannot be a channel via which the weather variations impact nancial deregulation.
It is possible that the size of population may be a¤ected by the variations of weather
indicators. First, we nd that the variations of weather variables (alone or jointly) are
not signicantly associated with the size of population. Second, even instrumenting the
size of population and economic growth with the variations of weather indicators, the
results on main explanatory variables remain similar to those in column 4.1 in Table 4.
Miguel et al. (2004) devote a lot of space to refuting the concern that their instrument
rainfall directly impacts social conict. They conclude: Nonetheless, we acknowledge
that we are unable to denitively rule out the possibility that rainfall could have some
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independent impact on the incidence of civil conict beyond its impact working through
economic growth.As far as our study is concerned, we argue that variations in tempera-
ture and hours of sunshine have no impact on the path and logic of nancial deregulation
in China. To show this, we directly regress nancial deregulation on the variations in tem-
perature and hours of sunshine, controlling for the same variables and time and province
e¤ects (regressions not shown). The estimated coe¢ cients on all the three weather indi-
cators are very insignicant. The F-test on their joint signicance yields a p-value of 0.88
(this contrasts with the jointly signicant e¤ect of the weather variations on economic
growth in our rst-stage regression in Table 3). The results are robust when we further
include growth in the regressions.
3.4 Robustness Checks
We rst check whether our results are robust to di¤erent estimation methods that deal
with di¤erent issues. Moreover, we report the results with the other two nancial dereg-
ulation indicators.
3.4.1 Weak instruments and LIML Estimation
As can be seen from the rst-stage results in Table 3, although the variations of the
weather indicators alone or jointly have signicant e¤ects on economic growth, the F-
statistic on the excluded instruments (the variations of the weather indicators) is slightly
smaller than 10. It is meaningful to check whether our results are robust to LIML esti-
mation that deals with weak instruments.
The weak identication (Cragg-Donald) test statistic is always larger than the Stock-
Yogo critical value for the 10% maximal LIML size, meaning we reject the null hypothesis
that the instruments are weak. Nevertheless, one can observe that the second-stage results
of LIML estimation reported in column 4.2 of Table 4 are almost identical to those of 2SLS
estimation in column 4.1. This is expected because when the instruments are strong the
2SLS and LIML estimations should produce similar results.
3.4.2 Heteroskedasticity and GMM Estimation
As Baum et al. (2003) argue, with strong instruments, one needs to choose between 2SLS
and GMM (Generalized method of moments) estimation. This is because of the possible
existence of heteroskedasticity. If heteroskedasticity is present, the GMM estimator is
more e¢ cient. Baum et al. state that the heteroskedasticity test statistic has not been
widely used in practice, perhaps because it is not a standard feature of most regression
packages.The heteroskedasticity test results are presented in columns 4.1 and 4.2. The
tests of heteroskedasticity suggest that there is clear evidence of non-i.i.d. errors, given
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that both the White and Breusch-Pagan statistics strongly reject. Therefore, we should
use robust covariance estimation in this case.
The second-stage results of robust covariance GMM estimation are presented in column
4.3 of Table 4. One can see that the results remain very similar to those of 2SLS and
LIML estimations in columns 4.1 and 4.2.
3.4.3 Results on the Other Financial Deregulation Indicators
We have two more nancial deregulation indicators. One is on the stock market and the
other measures all the nancial deregulation policies (the banking/nonbank sector and
the stock market). The second-stage results of 2SLS, LIML and GMM estimations are
reported in Table 5. Generally, the patterns of the results are similar to those in Table
4. The estimated coe¢ cient on growth is negative and insignicant in columns 5.1 to
5.3, meaning economic growth has no signicant e¤ect on stock market deregulation. The
estimated coe¢ cient on growth is positive and insignicant in columns 5.4 to 5.6, showing
that economic growth has a positive but insignicant e¤ect on nancial deregulation.
[Table 5 Here]
4 Conclusions
In this paper we use the Chinese gradual nancial deregulation experience to investigate
whether growth causes nance. Using the variations of contemporary weather variables
to overcome the endogeneity of economic growth, we nd that growth has no signicant
e¤ect on nancial deregulation after controlling for lagged home-bias political variable,
the logarithm of population size, and time and province e¤ects. The home-bias political
variable has a signicant e¤ect on nancial deregulation, which shows that political and
cultural factors are important driving forces in determining the path and logic of Chinese
nancial deregulation. Despite that our measurement of main indicators and the empirical
strategy may not be perfect, our study contributes to solving the direction of causality
between economic growth and nancial deregulation in China.
The next step, for instance, would be to examine whether nancial deregulation has
a causal e¤ect on growth, which is left to future research.
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Appendix: Data on Average Annual Growth Rate, Financial Deregulation and Home-bias Politics
Annual Annual
Province Growth BANK FD POLITICS Province Growth BANK FD POLITICS
Beijing (1981-86) 6.0 1.25 1.25 0 Shandong 7.2 0.19 0.19 6
Beijing (1987-92) 5.0 6.76 7.92 1.5 Shandong 5.7 1.07 1.07 8.2
Beijing (1993-98) 9.5 8.76 11.05 2.3 Shandong 9.5 2.71 2.71 7.9
Tianjin 5.6 1.54 1.54 0 Henan 5.9 0.02 0.02 2
Tianjin 4.2 6.24 7.08 0.4 Henan 3.8 0.16 0.16 2.6
Tianjin 12.0 6.33 7.33 1.2 Henan 7.8 0.12 0.12 2.8
Hebei 6.2 0.42 0.42 9 Hubei 7.5 0.45 0.45 3
Hebei 5.6 1.29 1.29 5 Hubei 4.6 1.81 1.99 1.2
Hebei 9.5 1.26 1.26 5.9 Hubei 10.2 1.97 2.18 5.2
Shanxi 7.7 0.01 0.05 3 Hunan 5.4 0.03 0.03 1
Shanxi 3.5 0.10 0.31 2.1 Hunan 3.4 0.22 0.22 0.4
Shanxi 7.8 0.05 0.27 4.8 Hunan 7.6 0.18 0.18 3.4
Inner Mongolia 7.5 0 0 1 Guangdong 7.7 0.85 0.86 1
Inner Mongolia 4.6 0 0 0 Guangdong 8.9 3.48 3.60 1.5
Inner Mongolia 8.1 0 0 0 Guangdong 9.0 4.70 4.85 3
Liaoning 6.0 0.51 0.55 4 Guangxi 3.6 0.01 0.01 0
Liaoning 4.3 2.40 2.81 1 Guangxi 5.2 0.03 0.03 1
Liaoning 8.2 3.39 3.83 2.6 Guangxi 6.9 0.03 0.03 0.2
Jilin 4.2 0.01 0.01 0 Guizhou 6.5 0 0 1
Jilin 2.6 1.03 1.03 0 Guizhou 2.4 0 0 0.2
Jilin 10.3 2.14 2.14 1.4 Guizhou 5.2 0 0 0
Heilongjiang 2.9 0.03 0.03 0 Yunnan 6.1 0 0 0
Heilongjiang 3.7 0.82 0.95 0 Yunnan 5.1 0 0 0
Heilongjiang 4.9 1.76 1.91 1 Yunnan 6.8 0 0 0
Shanghai 6.3 1.79 3.29 2 Shaanxi 6.6 0.14 0.14 1
Shanghai 6.6 8.40 15.73 3.2 Shaanxi 4.3 0.97 0.97 0.6
Shanghai 11.7 11.49 20.49 7.5 Shaanxi 6.3 0.93 0.93 2.5
Jiangsu 7.9 0.49 0.49 8 Gansu 5.1 0 0 1
Jiangsu 7.9 1.86 1.86 6.6 Gansu 4.7 0.10 0.10 0.5
Jiangsu 11.0 2.86 2.93 10.3 Gansu 6.5 0.06 0.06 0
Zhejiang 8.2 0.57 0.57 3 Qinghai 6.5 0 0 0
Zhejiang 6.8 2.08 2.08 5.4 Qinghai 2.2 0.24 0.24 0
Zhejiang 11.0 3.13 3.13 6.1 Qinghai 5.8 0.24 0.24 0
Anhui 6.9 0 0 4 Ningxia 6.7 0 0 0
Anhui 2.0 0.29 0.29 1.8 Ningxia 3.2 0.11 0.11 0
Anhui 9.6 1.25 1.25 5.1 Ningxia 5.0 0.11 0.11 0
Fujian 6.0 0.60 1.43 3 Xinjiang 8.7 0.01 0.01 0
Fujian 6.9 2.95 2.95 2.26 Xinjiang 7.2 0.17 0.17 0.5
Fujian 10.7 5.11 5.16 1.7 Xinjiang 6.3 0.13 0.13 1
Jiangxi 6.0 0.33 0.33 2
Jiangxi 5.2 1.29 1.29 0
Jiangxi 6.5 2.25 2.25 0.6
Note: Growth rates are in percentage.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
BANK 1.41 2.24 0 11.49
FD 1.73 3.34 0 20.49
STOCK 0.33 1.31 0 9
Growth (annual, %) 6.47 2.26 2.00 12.00
POLITICS 2.19 2.53 0 10.3
ln(POP) 7.98 0.79 5.99 9.12
Observations: 81. The data are six-year averages for 27 provinces.
Table 2. LSDV Regressions between Financial Deregulation and Economic Growth
Regression number
2.1 2.2 2.3
Dependent variable as
Independent Variable BANK FD STOCK
Growth
0.34
(0.12)
0.44
(0.18)
0.10
(0.08)
POLITICS
0.31
(0.14)
0.58
(0.22)
0.27
(0.09)
ln (POP )
5.83
(8.22)
11.65
(12.56)
5.82
(5.36)
Time Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Province Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.85 0.84 0.81
Observations 81 81 81
***Signicant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, * at the 0.10 level
(standard errors in parentheses)
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Table 3. Regressions between Financial Deregulation and Economic Growth
First-stage Results. Dependent variable: average annual growth 1981-87, 1988-92, 1983-98
Regression number
Independent Variable 3.1 3.2
Sunvar
0.0007
(0.0002)
0.00056
(0.00023)
Tempdi¤
1.48
(0.54)
1.64
(0.53)
Tempvar
 0.14
(0.056)
 0.15
(0.056)
POLITICS
0.22
(0.15)
ln (POP )
 21.60
(8.77)
Time Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
Province Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes
F-test on weather indicators
(p-value)
F(3,49)=6.53
(0.0008)
F(3,47)=6.62
(0.0008)
R2 0.81 0.84
Observations 81 81
***Signicant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, * at the 0.10 level
(standard errors in parentheses)
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Table 4. Regressions between Financial Deregulation and Economic Growth
Second-stage results. Second-stage dependent variable: BANK
Regression number
4.1 4.2 4.3
Estimation Method
Independent Variable 2SLS LIML GMM
Growth
0.13
(0.17)
0.12
(0.17)
0.10
(0.15)
POLITICS
0.38
(0.13)
0.38
(0.13)
0.43
(0.16)
ln (POP )
1.66
(7.20)
1.54
(7.22)
0.65
(8.19)
Time Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Province Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
OverID Test: p-value Sargan chi2(2): 0.73 Anderson-Rubin chi2(2): 0.7 Hansens J chi2(2): 0.6
OverID Test: p-value Basmann chi2(2): 0.8 Basmann F(2, 48): 0.83
White/Koenker nR2 test p-value: 0.01 p-value: 0.01
Breusch-Pagan p-value: 0.0000 p-value: 0.0000
R2 0.84 0.84 0.84
Observations 81 81 81
Note: endogenous variable: Growth.
Excluded instruments: Sunvar, Tempdi¤, Tempvar
***Signicant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, * at the 0.10 level
(standard errors in parentheses)
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Table 5. Regressions between Financial Deregulation and Economic Growth
Second-stage results.
Regression number
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6
Second-stage Dependent variable as
STOCK FD
Estimation Method
Independent Variable 2SLS LIML GMM 2SLS LIML GMM
Growth
 0.001
(0.11)
 0.003
(0.11)
 0.04
(0.04)
0.13
(0.26)
0.13
(0.26)
0.09
(0.18)
POLITICS
0.30
(0.08)
0.30
(0.08)
0.20
(0.13)
0.68
(0.19)
0.68
(0.19)
0.68
(0.29)
ln (POP )
3.81
(4.62)
3.76
(4.63)
0.62
(2.55)
5.47
(10.97)
5.42
(10.98)
1.99
(9.53)
Time Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
OverID Test: p-value Sargan: 0.74 A-R: 0.74 J: 0.18 Sargan: 0.91 A-R:: 0.91 J: 0.82
Basmann OverID Test: p-value 0.84 0.84 0.94 0.94
R2 0.81 0.81 0.79 0.83 0.83 0.83
Observations 81 81 81 81 81 81
Note: endogenous variable: Growth.
Excluded instruments: Sunvar, Tempdi¤, Tempvar
***Signicant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, * at the 0.10 level
(standard errors in parentheses)
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Figure 1. Agricultural Dependence in China (1981-1998).
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